Northstowe – the tragic errors

Initially I intended to call this article ‘The Tragedie of Northstowe’. Like Shakespeare’s tragedies it concerns a great and noble house brought low by a succession of errors and misjudgements. But this is 2022, and there are lots of houses…

We have to start in the early years of the century when planning for the settlement began. Let’s recall what the world – and our region in particular – was like then. To begin with, the effects of global warning were still subtle and its very existence was still disputed in certain political quarters. The economy was flourishing. While foot and mouth had devastated the farming sector in 2001, COVID was not even a dark stain on the horizon. Cambridge in particular was booming as a centre of high tech research and industry. The Oxford-London-Cambridge arc concept began to emerge in 2003.

One enduring national priority, then as now, and more or less perpetually since the 2nd World War devastated our housing stock, was the provision of affordable housing to fulfil the needs of a growing, and increasingly affluent, population. Government brought pressure on local councils under something called the ‘National Planning Policy Framework’. Councils had a standard method to calculate their housing needs and were required to make sufficient land available to fill the expectation. In some areas councils were forced to allow building in places that were, by any measure, unsuitable for human habitation.

..a good idea at the time..

One measure that was taken to make more land available was the removal, by the Cameron government, of the Environment Agency’s right to veto new building developments on flood plains. To this day tens of thousands of homes are built on flood plains every year and it is estimated that some 5.5 million homes are now on land subject to flooding.

In Greater Cambridge, certain businesses and the University provided ridiculously high growth forecasts, exceeding even the standard method adopted under the National Planning Policy Framework, further increasing the pressure to build new homes.

And so… Northstowe. Not the only major housing development in the region, but the largest by far.

What went wrong?

Hindsight, as we know is a wonderful thing. Now that the effects are becoming increasingly obvious, we are beginning to realise what a poisoned heritage the planners of the Northstowe project have left us. Experts are employed and paid for their experience and foresight and we have a right to expect that most problems that can be avoided will be avoided in the planning stages. Sadly, the performance of the Northstowe planners fell well short of reasonable expectation.

             A pond on the golf course, pre-dewatering

First of all, it is now known that Northstowe Phase 1 was never really intended to happen. The original plan was for development on the land that was previously an immigration centre and before that a World War 2 airfield. This was a brown field site: indeed, some parts of it were seriously contaminated by its wartime usage. We now know it as Phase 2. But the land to the north, at the time occupied by the golf course and previously agricultural, was too tempting to ignore. It would make possible a significant increase in the number of homes that could be built. So the plans were expanded northwards.

That brought some problems that the planners apparently decided were outweighed by the advantages:

  • The new area was slightly, but significantly lower than the original brown field site.
  • It had obvious drainage issues, as anyone who ever ventured on the golf course in winter can attest. The golf course’s drainage ditches were 15 feet deep.
  • The site of the former golf course, soon to be Northstowe Phase 1, was less than 5 metres above mean sea level. (‘mean sea level’ is not approved terminology: correctly the term ‘above ordnance datum’ should be used, but for practical purposes we will stick to more familiar language.)
The site was raised to 5 metres…

It was decided that due to the risk of flooding, all buildings would be raised by artificially building up the base to a minimum of 5 metres. This had to be done on top of variable fen soil and in turn meant that unusually deep foundations had to be dug for every house built. To do this, it was necessary to dewater the area so that work could proceed safely.

It is that dewatering that is now causing the problems of the ground drying out around Longstanton. The groundwater aquifer is not very deep but it covers quite a large area and a huge quantity of water has had to be pumped out at a very high rate. Apart from the obvious effects on Longstanton, this has also caused problems for the Swavesey and Old West Drainage Boards who have been left to deal with unexpectedly large quantities of water and move them up into the river.

It is clear that the planners do not understand the role of the Internal Drainage Boards. The IDBs have a dual responsibility: to keep the fen dry in winter and watered in summer for growers and farmers. The plight of Clive Hayden and his nursery on Rampton Road which has now lost its historic water supply has been widely reported. How many other farmers are unable to irrigate root crops and potatoes as they normally would at this time of year?

                          …and construction began

The question must be asked: were the consequences of these decisions predictable? Could they have been avoided? Well, yes, if integrity of the environment and the safety of nearby settlements like Longstanton hadn’t taken second place to political expedients. Senior planners must now be aware that they got it wrong, but it is hard for councils to acknowledge this publicly. The current council has been supporting even more growth around Cambridge than its political opponents; nevertheless in politics a U-turn may be a signal of strength rather than weakness.

The last act

Does this drama have a conclusion? – a sequel?

The drama has not yet run its course. Residents of Longstanton are waking up to the enormity of the outrage that has been visited upon them. The signs are all around in dried-up ponds, waterless ditches, dead and dying trees, even the first signs of damage to buildings. In other nearby villages realisation is dawning that the water that once supplied Longstanton now risks descending on them in quantities the drainage boards cannot manage, resulting in floods.

Whatever factors may have influenced the original Northstowe planning process, it is important to recognise that the parameters have changed.

  • Funding for the Oxford-London-Cambridge arc is being reduced. Growth here will slow. ‘Levelling-up’ policies suggest that growth and re-generation will be diverted to other parts of the country.
  • In a post-COVID society many commercial properties will no longer be required, and thus become available for conversion into accommodation. The imperative in this region to keep building at all costs does not have the urgency it once had.
  • A looming period of recession will deter new building projects. Already, one major developer on Phase 2 has gone into administration.
  • Climate change means that sea levels are rising; more frequent periods of drought and torrential rain will exacerbate the drainage problems and increase the risk of flooding, both in Northstowe itself and in the surrounding areas served by the Drainage Boards.
    Edit: comment received from CPRE 12th September: “The news last week about the rapid rate of loss of the Greenland ice sheet will have significantly brought forward the timing and increased the potential effects of flood risk.”
  • Climate change again, coupled with the effects of BREXIT and international conflicts, mean that the UK has finally realised that it must produce more of its own food. The building/farming balance is changing.
  • The chalk streams and aquifers that serve the Cambridge region with its potable water are among the most over-abstracted and abused in the country. The Environment Agency has already warned Cambridge Water that it must reduce abstraction rates, not increase them.
  • Recently announced plans to relieve the water supply problem by building new reservoirs in North Lincolnshire are flawed. North Lincolnshire is one of the driest areas of the country; reservoirs in the fens would have to be be shallow, subject to high rates of evaporation, and the water would need to be piped across unstable fenland to population centres.
     ‘a poisoned heritage’ – Ladywalk pond 2AD (after ducks)

Later this year, if all goes according to plan, a Judicial Review will reach court, seeking to set aside, or at least delay, planning decisions made in respect of Phase 3A of the Northstowe development. The fact that the deficiencies of the Northstowe planning process are likely to end in court, whatever the outcome, should give the local planning authorities pause. It is time to acknowledge that mistakes were made, that people’s lives and well-being have been affected, that political decisions do not necessarily need to be cast in stone but can evolve as the environment changes and lessons are learned.
Once that is done, serious thought can be given to what can be done to repair, or at least ameliorate the damage already done. Perhaps it is the prospect of putting things right that has the planners running for cover.

But if Shakespeare’s tragedies teach us one thing, it is that peace and normality only return when the errors and injustices have been exposed and the price has been paid.

This article was written by Steve Smith, who also took the photographs. It is based on information provided by the Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), to whom we would like to express our thanks.